No, Trump is not in Putin’s pocket

Two things are supposedly ‘known’ about Donald Trump and Ukraine. The first is his campaign pledge, articulated with varying degrees of bravado, that he will end the war within a day of becoming US president in January. The second is that any ‘deal’ that he brokers or backs will be largely on Russia’s terms.

Among Ukraine’s allies, the first is generally derided as unrealistic. The second is taken for granted. But both assumptions deserve closer scrutiny.

Of course, it is unrealistic to credit anyone, even a US president, with being able to end the Russia-Ukraine war within 24 hours. That Trump and the team he has now largely put in place could pave the way for a ceasefire sooner rather than later, however, should not be dismissed too readily.

Trump’s election victory was followed by a marked and almost instant change of approach and language on the part of many of Ukraine’s Western allies. The UK may remain something of an outlier, but elsewhere the all-or-nothing insistence that Ukraine will and must win, whatever it takes, however long it takes, has largely been replaced by talk of a possible ceasefire, sooner rather than later.

The change of language can be seen even among such staunch supporters of Ukraine as Poland, whose prime minister, Donald Tusk, recently said that talks on ending Russia’s war in Ukraine could begin ‘this winter’. He was outlining plans for Poland’s presidency of the EU, which begins in January. In another noteworthy change, Tusk’s comments attracted nothing like the opprobrium drawn by Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, when he went to Moscow and Kyiv to explore the prospects for diplomacy at the start of Hungary’s EU presidency in July.

Most striking of all, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, has also found a new vocabulary. A few weeks ago, he mentioned the prospect of diplomacy. In a Sky News interview last month, he suggested that Ukraine might be prepared to give up, on a temporary basis, land currently occupied by Russia. He also referred to a NATO ‘umbrella’ to protect the rest of Ukraine, rather than formal membership of the alliance.

It is fair to say that Zelensky’s words have been interpreted differently by different people, with some stressing that the idea of giving up territory in the short term is conditional on NATO protection for the rest of Ukraine. Others note that NATO would never agree to protect part of a divided country, and so this is just a roundabout way of sending the old message of ‘no deal’. It could also be argued, however, that the introduction of new words into Zelensky’s discourse is significant in itself, suggesting elements of flexibility after months of hammering home the same ‘no compromise’ message. It might offer the first hint of change, even as Russia continues to make gains on the battlefield.

As for the view that any agreement in which Trump plays a role will necessarily amount to sacrificing Ukraine, this also deserves to be challenged. The presumption stems from the idea, which was prevalent before and during Trump’s first term in the White House, that Trump is either a big admirer of Putin or in Putin’s pocket. Neither is true. To the extent that he has expressed admiration for the Russian president, it has always been for particular traits. As Trump sees it, Putin is a strong national leader who stands up for what he sees as his country’s national interests – in contrast, as Trump then saw it, to former US president Barack Obama.

What Trump admires in Putin mirrors how he sees himself and how he believes a national leader ought to be. This is also why, it seems to me, Trump may have a lot more time for the Ukrainian president than is often believed. Zelensky, too, would fit Trump’s criteria for a strong national leader with the interests of his own country paramount. Ukraine’s strong sense of national identity is, similarly, something that would appeal to Trump. You can see this in his admiration for France, despite his political differences with Macron. Trump clearly adored being part of the Bastille Day festivities as president in 2017, and being in attendance last week at the reopening of Notre Dame cathedral as president-elect.

It is true that the Trump-Zelensky relationship got off to a poor start, when Trump tried to pressure the then-novice Ukrainian president into providing material that would compromise Joe Biden’s son, Hunter Biden, in the run-up to the 2020 election. But that was then, and this is now.

Zelensky is known to have had two meetings with Donald Trump since he promised to end a war he views as ‘unnecessary’ and ‘ridiculous’. The first was in New York, during the UN General Assembly and before his election, and the second was last weekend in Paris. Some assessments have been negative. Some say the body language on both occasions was awkward. That the meeting in Paris lasted only 20 minutes. And that Trump embarrassed Zelensky by supposedly putting words into his mouth about supporting a ceasefire.

Appearances may not tell the whole story, however. Trump is a big man while Zelensky is compact, which does not make for good photos. Twenty minutes seem entirely reasonable for a meeting on the periphery of the Notre Dame celebrations. And as for essentially railroading the Ukrainian president into supposedly supporting a ceasefire, Zelensky has subsequently said as much on his own account. He has also said that he believes Trump has a better chance of ending the war than Biden.

The bigger question might be whether, as has sometimes been suggested, Trump’s main move to end the war would be to announce an immediate halt to all US aid (military and financial), effectively forcing a Ukrainian surrender on whatever terms Putin wanted to impose. It is true that Ukraine is almost completely dependent on US support for continuing the war. European powers could go nowhere near making up the shortfall should the US withdraw. But is the capitulation of Ukraine really what Trump has in mind?

A threat to stop support might encourage Ukraine towards talks, but an undertaking to step up that support, should Moscow refuse to engage, could also feature in the Trump playbook. As could some calculation about how the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria might have weakened Russia.

It has also been noted that Trump’s team includes some Russia hawks. His designated defence secretary, Pete Hegseth, has branded Putin a ‘war criminal’ and once warned that any ceasefire would be seen by Russia as merely an ‘an opportunity to reload’. Then there’s also the vice-president-elect, JD Vance, for whom ending the war is a priority. Trump surprised some by naming a military man, retired lieutenant general Keith Kellogg, as his special envoy on Ukraine, who says there should be a ceasefire, but also that the US should step up aid if Moscow doesn’t play ball.

None of this makes it likely that the war will end on day one or two of the Trump presidency. But hostilities could cease a lot sooner than many think, with a reprise of something like the Istanbul talks of April 2022, when Russian and Ukrainian officials engaged in direct negotiations, even as the war raged. And if there are talks, yes, they could fail. But that is yet another presumption that could turn out to be wrong.

Mary Dejevsky is a writer and broadcaster. She was Moscow correspondent for The Times between 1988 and 1992. She has also been a correspondent from Paris, Washington and China.