How ‘state-building’ weakens states
The new focus on the international community’s ‘responsibility to protect’ failing states is external meddling by another name.
State-building – the development of international regulatory mechanisms aimed at addressing cases of state ‘collapse’ or at shoring up ‘failing states’ – is commonly held to be the most pressing question on the global security agenda (1).
As the 2002 US National Security Strategy states: ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.’ (2) In August 2004, the US government established a state-building department, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; in February 2005, the UK government’s Strategy Unit report Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response viewed state-building as a key part of its ‘partnerships for stability’ agenda; in September 2005, the UN world summit agreed on the establishment of a proposed Peace-Building Commission to coordinate international activity in this area (3).
The focus on state capacities and institutions seems to herald a shift away from the 1990s when new, more interventionist, norms were heralded which challenged the fundamental rights of state sovereignty – those of self-government and non-intervention. These rights took their clearest institutional form in the UN Charter framework of international law, which emphasised the rights of peoples to self-government (Article 1.2), the sovereign equality of member states (Article 2.1), and the principle of non-intervention – outlawing the threat or use of force (Article 2.4) (4). Throughout the Cold War, successive UN Assembly resolutions and judgements of the International Court of Justice upheld these rights to self-government and denied the existence of any legitimate grounds for external intervention, even on the basis of ‘humanitarian’ or ‘human rights’ justifications (5).
After the end of the Cold War, this framework was challenged and security concerns were focused on the rights of individuals – which were often posed counter to the rights of states. States were no longer conceived of as the primary referent for security, and state sovereignty was no longer considered to be an absolute barrier to external intervention (6). Following extended intervention in Iraq, to protect the Kurds and Marsh Arabs after the 1991 Gulf War, and external military intervention for humanitarian purposes in Somalia (in 1992-3) and Bosnia (1993-5), the highpoint of this new focus on the human rights of individuals rather than the sovereign rights of states was the NATO-led international intervention over Kosovo in 1999.
Today, the state is once more at the centre of security concerns. In the aftermath of 9/11 – where the failure of the Afghan state to control its borders and the activities of its citizens was held to have opened the way for al-Qaeda’s operations – the state is no longer viewed from a mainly negative perspective. It now appears that states, particularly those that have been marginalised by the world economy or weakened by conflict, can no longer be ignored or isolated but must be supported, aided and capacity-built.
This essay seeks to raise some important questions regarding the vision of the state that is being placed at the centre of international security policymaking. The next section puts the state-building discussion in the context of the 1990s decade of humanitarian intervention. The following sections then lay out specific problems which highlight the corrosive nature of current policy practices in this area: firstly, that they lack any coherent framework or clear purpose; secondly, that this framework tends to undermine the capacity of the states intervened in; and thirdly, that they enable international interveners to evade political accountability.
From the ‘right to intervene’ to state-building
The focus on the state may seem to be a reaction against the ‘humanitarian intervention’ policies of the 1990s, which are sometimes held to have underestimated the importance of states for maintaining international stability (7). In fact, ‘bringing the state back in’ in the policy discussions of state failure and state-building is an extension of the agenda of internationalising the domestic policymaking sphere of non-Western states. The challenge of ‘failing states’, or of post-conflict reconstruction, is held today to warrant extensive external monitoring and engagement in every aspect of these states’ governmental affairs (8).
In this context, where the non-Western state seems to have already been substantially weakened in terms of both capacities and legitimacy, there is a strong consensus among those engaged in state-building that, while states might be important, ‘strong’ states are deeply problematic – that state capacities should not include the traditional ‘right to do what they will within their own borders’ (9). In fact, the more one investigates the state capacity-building literature, the clearer it becomes that the aim is not to create states as classically understood, as self-governing, independent and autonomous political subjects (10).
In fact, the focus on the state is designed to undermine and restrict the non-Western state’s capacity for independence and autonomous decision-making under new external regimes of ‘good governance’. This transition away from the language of humanitarian intervention and towards the focus on broader questions of the domestic management of non-Western states was codified in a report published by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 2001, titled Responsibility to Protect – meaning it was formulated before 9/11. In this widely cited report, the Commission proposed a shift in language away from the ‘human-centred’ framework of a ‘right to intervention’ and towards a ‘state-centred’ framework of the ‘responsibility to protect’. Whereas the ‘right of intervention’ put the emphasis on the international interveners to justify and legitimise their actions, the ‘responsibility to protect’ sought to deflect this ‘attention on the claims, rights and prerogatives of the potentially intervening states’ (11).
The ICISS report successfully set out to ‘shift the terms of the debate’ and has facilitated the evasion of any clarification of the competing rights of state sovereignty and of those of intervening powers, by arguing that state rights of sovereignty can coexist with external intervention and state-building. The report spells out that, in its view, ‘sovereignty then means accountability to two separate constituencies: internally, to one’s own population; and internationally, to the community of responsible states’ (12). As the Commission co-chairs note, this shift changes ‘the essence of sovereignty, from control to responsibility’ (13).
The major implications that this shift would have for accountability (a power that is accountable to another, external, body clearly lacks sovereign authority – the capacity for self-government) have been consistently played down by the report’s authors and academic commentators. Robert Keohane, for example, argues that the ICISS report is not at all ‘devaluing’ sovereignty, merely that it is ‘reinterpreting’ it, to bring the concept more into line with the modern world (14).
Rather than the 1990s debate, where international intervention was posed in terms of a clash of competing rights – the ‘right of intervention’ against the ‘right of state sovereignty’ – today the language is one of consensus, of partnership, of empowerment and capacity-building. The product of this change has been the enthronement of the state-building discourse as the framework for discussing Western regulation of and intervention in non-Western states.
My critique of this framework is that it seeks to obfuscate and confuse relations of power and accountability, which stood clearly exposed in the 1990s as a fundamental clash of rights. In effect, the language of the ‘responsibility to protect’ seeks to emphasise the responsibilities of the non-Western state at the same time as these states increasingly lose the traditional attribute of sovereignty: self-government.
Western states may sometimes appear to be happy with the traditional imperialist rhetoric of Great Power responsibility but are quick to recoil from any practical consequences of this. They are loath to be held to account for the outcomes of their interventionist policies; preferring to hide behind the language of ‘partnership’ and to operate through international institutions such as the ad hoc Peace Implementation Council, formally accountable for the management of Bosnia, or the United Nations and the European Union. Where it has not been possible to ‘diffuse’ accountability the emphasis has been on ‘handing back sovereignty’ as rapidly as possible.
If we are witnessing the return of imperialism or empire, it seems to bear little relation to the self-confident drive to reshape the world in the imperial image or transform the societies touched by it (15). Western governments seem to be drawn towards intervention but at the same time have little strategic vision or clear goals. In fact, the responsibilities of power seem to be an embarrassment rather than an asset.
The state-building project is often presented as one that is ill-fated from the start; one that is vital but from which few results can be expected. Few commentators would argue that the policies pursued in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan or Iraq should be replicated on a wider basis. Francis Fukuyama, for example, argues that state-building efforts to date have done more to destroy institutional capacity than to build it, creating a culture of dependency rather than self-sustaining indigenous institutions (16). The lessons learned from various projects are uniformly negative ones, summed up by Roland Paris’ bleak conclusions that attempting to rebuild post-conflict states based on liberal democracy and the market is far too optimistic (17). One recent study, the final product of the ICISS Responsibility to Protect project, concludes that ‘the key insight is that states cannot be made to work from the outside…. For international actors, this is a humbling conclusion: assistance is often a necessary but never a sufficient factor in achieving success.’ (17)
It seems that there is, in fact, an inverse relationship between the expanding prescriptive programmes forwarded by international state-builders and their confidence in their success. As Marina Ottaway notes: ‘the international community has developed a set of prescriptions for state reconstruction that is so exhaustive that it cannot possibly be followed in practice.’ (18)
It may appear that the debacle in Iraq is an exceptional circumstance, where armed insurgency has undermined international aspirations to transform the Iraqi state. Certainly the question of the purpose and the efficacy of international state-building has been sharply posed in this context (19). Yet, uncertainty over the purpose of external state-building predated the armed uprising, with policy being developed in an ad hoc way with no clear central guidance or coordination (20). The same problems of drift and lack of coherence were marked in the international administrations of Bosnia and Kosovo, where there appeared to be little progress or clear direction towards the establishment of self-sustaining state institutions (21).
This ‘fragile empire’ is destructive in its undermining of the non-Western state but appears incapable of offering anything in its place. Instead it seeks to deny its own power and evade accountability. This act of evasion is even more destructive for the non-Western states and societies that are engaged with. State-building attempts to institutionalise international regulation in the fake language of ‘partnerships’ where ‘responsibility’ is held to rest firmly with the non-Western state being ‘capacity-built’ in the process of external subordination (22).
In this respect, the EU foreign policy of ‘state-building’ is the mirror-image of domestic politics in the way it leads member states in the attempt to distance power and responsibility. As Fukuyama notes, the EU itself is an ‘anti-sovereignty project’, an attempt to divorce power from accountability (23). There is an irony in some of the most powerful states in the world pretending that they no longer exist, and that the EU has transcended power politics (24), while talking up the importance of the state-form in subordinate states to avoid taking responsibility for the projection of their influence abroad.
Building states that are not designed to be independent political subjects in anything but name creates a façade without content. Bosnia is possibly the clearest case of the new type of state being built through this process of distancing power and responsibility. To all intents and purposes Bosnia is a member of the European Union; in fact, more than that, Bosnia is the first genuine EU state where sovereignty has in effect been transferred to Brussels. The EU provides its government; the international High Representative is an EU employee and the EU’s Special Representative in Bosnia. This EU administrator has the power to directly impose legislation and to dismiss elected government officials and civil servants.
The EU also runs the police force, taking over from the United Nations at the end of 2002, and the military, taking over from NATO at the end of 2004. The EU also manages Bosnia’s negotiations with the World Bank (25). One look at the Bosnian flag – with the stars of the EU on a yellow and blue background chosen to be in exactly the same colours as used in the EU flag – demonstrates that Bosnia is more EU-orientated than any current member state (26). However, the EU has distanced itself from any responsibility for the power it exercises over Bosnia; formally Bosnia is an independent state and member of the United Nations and a long way off meeting the requirements of EU membership.
After 10 years of state-building in Bosnia, there is now a complete separation between power and accountability. In formal terms, Bosnia is a state on the margins of Europe, where the postwar state is divided into entities with a complex form of consociational power-sharing. The key debate, as with other states in the Balkans, is over ‘the road to Europe’, with ever-growing hurdles to jump, such as: the handing over of war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague; and issues over minority return, corruption, environmental regulations, etc. The long process of negotiating European membership, through ‘Partnership’ agreements and the Stability and Association process, is the form international state-building takes; this process distances the potential accession states at the same time as giving the EU greater regulatory authority. The decision-making power lies with Brussels but the accountability rests with the governments of the Balkan states.
The more Bosnia has been the subject of external state-building, the less like a traditional state it has become. In fact, as considered above, the state-building project is less about building genuine state institutions, which can only be done in relationship to social demands and pressures, than it is about asserting influence while evading responsibility. While Bosnia may be the clearest example of this process, the same dynamic is necessarily present in all other state-building situations. Law and reality no longer coincide when considering the location of sovereign power and authority (27).
Kosovo, for example, is, at the time of writing, formally part of the state of Serbia-Montenegro, but again there is an unresolved question regarding sovereignty over the province: does it lie with Belgrade, with the Kosovan government, or with the United Nations? Similarly, did the formal transfer of Iraqi sovereignty from the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority to an Iraqi government in June 2004 reflect any change in the real relations of authority? Bearing in mind the restrictions on its right to change existing legal regulations, to what extent does the Iraqi government have even formal political autonomy, the right to self-government? (28)
The corrosive consequences of this are clear. If states lack self-determination and sovereignty it appears that it is very difficult for the state-form to have any real purchase. If states are constructed as administrative centres, directed from Brussels or Washington, there is little possibility that they will be able to strengthen their relationship with their societies. This is particularly problematic in situations where states have a weak social basis or their societies are particularly divided or fragmented (29). States have only ever been ‘capacity-built’ by being able to generate support through engaging their societies and giving individuals and social groups a stake in the state-building project.
A state cannot engage its citizens and represent a collective or social commitment without a substantial element of autonomy. It is the state’s collective purpose that enables a state to establish strong secondary institutions such as a civil service, judiciary and police. Without a cohering ‘idea of the state’, no manner of externally funded bureaucratic training exercises will achieve the expected reforms; matters of trust and loyalty cannot be inculcated bureaucratically (30). The lack of loyalty to the state, despite external training, was readily apparent in the performances of the Iraqi police and army, who were as likely to side with the insurgents as the government, but has created similarly artificial secondary institutions in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (31).
Redefining sovereignty – evading accountability
Today, despite the new interventionist consensus, there are surprisingly few commentators who argue that these new powers of intervention should be made accountable. Those who do argue for accountability tend to be conservative theorists who profess faith in the virtues of empire and suggest that the current relations of domination should be formalised in ‘neotrusteeships’ or ‘conservatorships’ or that states should be ‘allowed to fail’ and neighbours or external guardians allowed to assimilate and to directly govern these territories (32). On the other side of the debate are those who advocate state-building and, in effect, argue for the separation of power and accountability, suggesting that states and sovereignty must be preserved and ‘strengthened’ at the same time that external regulation is increasingly institutionalised free from accountability.
Leading US academics working closely with the US government – for example, Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Stephen Krasner – are going beyond the bounds of academic duty in their attempt to pretend that non-Western states are alive and well and that they have sovereign responsibilities. Keohane, following Krasner’s formulation, argues that sovereignty should be ‘unbundled’ so that ‘the classic ideal-type of Westphalian sovereignty [ie, self-government] should be abandoned even as an aspiration’ (33). Yet, while happy to abandon the content of state sovereignty – the capacity for self-government – these theorists seek to revive the form of state sovereignty as an empty shell. In effect, the shell is ‘unbundled’ from its content. Once this is done, both states and sovereignty are considered to be important to uphold. As Keohane clarifies, this ‘abandonment’ or ‘unbundling’ does not have to be acknowledged too publicly, and ‘is not to say that the state should be abandoned or that sovereignty should be discredited as a concept’:
‘We somehow have to reconceptualise the state as a political unit that can maintain internal order while being able to engage in international cooperation, without claiming the exclusive rights…traditionally associated with sovereignty.… The same institutional arrangements may help both to reconstruct troubled countries that are in danger of becoming “failed states”, and to constrain the autonomy of those states.’ (34)
Keohane suggests that state-building can establish the ‘institutional arrangements’ that are capable of taking responsibility for maintaining order domestically but not capable of claiming sovereign rights. Here, the non-Western state is conceived in purely administrative and bureaucratic terms as a conduit for external policy: as a state without sovereignty. He correctly credits the European Union with going further than any other international institution in the direction of ‘state-building’, praising the EU’s post-conflict state management approach in the Balkans for demonstrating ‘that regaining sovereignty need not be one’s long-term objective’ (35). Krasner argues the point even more openly in his support for the concept of ‘shared’ sovereignty, which similarly uses ‘sovereignty’ as a means for enabling external regulation:
‘For policy purposes, it would be best to refer to shared sovereignty as partnerships. This would more easily let policymakers engage in organised hypocrisy, saying one thing and doing another. Shared sovereignty or partnerships would allow political leaders to embrace sovereignty, since these arrangements would be legitimated by the target state’s international legal sovereignty, while at the same time violating autonomy, the core principle of [traditional] sovereignty…. It would allow actors to obfuscate the fact that their behaviour would be inconsistent with their principles.’ (36)
Policy advisers can no doubt see the gains to be made in enabling Western governments to talk about sovereignty and accountability in non-Western states, while in reality emasculating state powers of political autonomy. The gains that Western governments accrue from this ‘obfuscation’ – in avoiding accountability for their actions – of course count as losses for those who not only have to live with the consequences of these policies but are also denied the right to hold those responsible to account.
State-building does not seek to universalise the state form – as in the period of decolonisation – but rather to conceal the disintegration of this form under the interventionist pressures of the post-Cold War international order. State-building as a framework for policymaking and intervention is one that seeks to distance power from accountability.
Opposition to these new forms of degraded intervention needs to highlight the real relations of power and argue against the mystifications of the state-building discourse. It is only on the basis of clarifying the corrosive consequences of external regulation that a new case for self-government and political autonomy can be made.
David Chandler is senior lecturer in international relations at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster in England. He will be speaking at the Battle for International Relations at the Battle of Ideas festival in London, 29-30 October 2005.
(1) According to Francis Fukuyama, ‘state-building is one of the most important issues for the world community’ and today has ‘risen to the top of the global agenda’ (Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century (London: Profile Books, 2004), p.ix; p.xi). Robert I. Rotberg argues that state-building has ‘become one of the critical all-consuming strategic and moral imperatives of our terrorized time’ (Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair’, in Robert I. Rotberg (ed.) When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.42).
(2) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Section 1, ‘Overview of America’s International Strategy’. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html.
(3) Website of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Development. Available at: http://www.state.gov/s/crs/. UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit Report, Investing in Prevention – An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response, February 2005. Available here. 2005 World Summit Outcome, United Nations General Assembly, A/60/L.1, 15 September 2005, §97-105. Available here.
(4) The UN Charter is available at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
(5) See further David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (London: Pluto Press, 2002), pp.157-66.
(6) See the series of UN Secretary-General reports, starting with the ground-breaking 1992 Agenda for Peace which advocated a new interventionist era, declaring that: ‘The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty…has passed.’ An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Democracy and Development, A/47/277 – S/24111,17 June 1992, §17. Available here.
(7) David M. Malone, ‘Foreword’, in Simon Chesterman et al (eds) Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance (Tokyo/ New York: UN University Press, 2005), p.xv.
(8) See for example, on state failure, Jack Straw, ‘Order out of Chaos: The Challenge of Failed States’, in Mark Leonard (ed.) Reordering the World (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002) and on post-conflict reconstruction, the seminal Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 2000. Available at: www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.
(9) See, for example, the universally positive reception given to the UN world summit declaration that the international community has the right to intervene if states fail ‘to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’, US President George W. Bush welcomed the development and argued that: ‘For the first time at this summit we are agreed that states do not have the right to do what they will within their own borders.’ 2005 World Summit Outcome, §139. Bush cited in Ian Williams, ‘Annan has paid his dues’, Guardian, 20 September 2005. See also ‘Oxfam welcomes historic anti-genocide move at UN summit’, Press Release, 14 September 2005. Available at: http://www.oxfam.org/eng/pr050914_un_r2p.htm.
(10) In fact, ‘strong’ states are seen to be as problematic as ‘weak’ states. See further, for example, I. William Zartman, on the ‘weak/soft’ and the ‘hard/brittle’ dilemma (Zartman, ‘Early and “Early Late” Prevention’, in Chesterman, Making States Work). Robert I. Rotberg argues that there is a ‘special category of weak state: the seemingly strong one’ and that the number of states in this category has grown rapidly in recent times (Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States’, p.5).
(11) International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, December 2001), p.16
(12) International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), p.11.
(13) Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6, (2002), p.101.
(14) Robert Keohane, ‘Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty’, in J. L. Holzgrefe and R. O. Keohane (eds) Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.276.
(15) On the categorisation of state-building as a return to the past of empire see, for example, Roland Paris, ‘International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’, Review of International Studies, Vol.28, No.4, (2002), pp.637-56; Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, ‘Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Travails of the European Raj’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, No.3, (2003), pp.60-74.
(16) Fukuyama, State-Building, pp.53-7.
(17) Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
(18) Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, ‘Introduction: Making States Work’, in Chesterman, Making States Work, p.9.
(19) Marina Ottaway, ‘Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States’, in Jennifer Milliken (ed.) State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p.252.
(20) On 22 September 2005, Colonel Tim Collins expressed the professional consensus at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, stating that ‘we clearly have no plan’ (Richard Norton-Taylor and Patrick Wintour, ‘Senior UK Officers Query Military’s Role’, Guardian, 24 September 2005). See also, Simon Jenkins, ‘To Say We Must Stay in Iraq to Save it from Chaos is a Lie’, Guardian, 21 September, 2005; Ewan MacAskill, ‘Lofty Ambitions Reduced to One: Iraq Must Not be Seen as a Failure’, Guardian, 22 September 2005.
(21) See the revealing memoir of a British provincial administrator in the Coalition Provisional Authority, Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris: The Al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq (London: Hurst & Co, 2005).
(22) On Bosnia, see Chandler (ed.) Peace without Politics? Ten Years of International State-Building in Bosnia (London: Routledge, 2005) and, on Kosovo, see Wim van Meurs, ‘Kosovo’s Fifth Anniversary – On the Road to Nowhere?’, Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol.3, No.3/4, (2004), pp.60-74. Available at: http://www.ethnopolitics.org/archive/volume_III/issue_3-4/vanmeurs.pdf.
(23) A consideration of current projects of international institutions engaging with non-Western states, such as the World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategies, EU enlargement or Stability Pact engagement with the Balkans or the US’s Millennium Challenge Account or the UN’s Millennium Goals, reveals that the normalisation of international intervention, of new relationships of inequality and external regulation, is increasingly presented in the framework of capacity-building, partnership and state-building.
(24) Fukuyama, State-Building, p.152.
(25) See, for example, Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).
(25) See Chandler, ‘From Dayton to Europe’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.3, (2005), pp.336-349.
(26) For more details, see Jos Poels, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: A new “neutral” flag’, Flagmaster, No.98, (1998), pp.9-12. Available at: http://www.flaginstitute.org/fibosnia.htm.
(27) Alexandros Yannis, ‘The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law and its Implications in International Politics’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 5, (2002), p.1049.
(28) See, for example, Naomi Klein, ‘Baghdad Year Zero’, in Klein et al, No War: America’s Real Business in Iraq (London, Gibson Square Books, 2005).
(29) See Christopher Bickerton, ‘Re-Constructing States, De-Constructing State-Building’, paper presented in the SAID seminar series, Oxford University, 28 April 2005.
(30) For more on the ‘idea of the state’ see Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (Harlow: Pearson, 1991), pp.69-82.
(31) The limited success of such bureaucratic schemes, which expect new loyalties to be generated in this way, is well documented, see, for example, Gemma Collantes Celador, ‘Police Reform: Peacebuilding through “Democratic Policing”?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.3, (2005), pp.364-76.
(32) James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘’Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States, International Security, Vol.28, No.4 (2004), pp.5-43; Jens Meierhenrich, ‘Forming States after Failure’, in Rotberg, When States Fail; Jeffrey Herbst, ‘Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice: Implications for Policy’, in Rotberg, When States Fail.
(33) Robert Keohane, ‘Political Authority after Intervention’, p.276, see also Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 1999).
(34) Ibid., p.277.
(35) Keohane, ‘Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.40, No.4, (2002), p.756.
(36) Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsing and Failing States’, Centre on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law/ Stanford Institute on International Studies, Working Papers, No.1, 2 November 2004, p.24
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