Going global: the politics of another planet
Are the ‘new global movements’ advancing a radical agenda - or just retreating from politics?
According to the radical guidebooks advertised in the Guardian and the New Statesman every week, a new worldwide revolution is in progress – a global movement against globalisation and capitalism and for justice, autonomy and civil society; a movement so large and diverse that it is often simply termed a new ‘movement of movements’.
The world is in revolt. Everywhere from the Zapitastas in Chiapas, often alleged to have founded the new global politics when they started their ‘postmodern’ 12-day rebellion on 1 January 1994, to the radical farmers protesting against GM crops in Latin America, India, Malaysia, the Philippines and South Africa, to the anti-privatisation struggles in South African shanty towns, to the Narmada Dan protests in India, to the struggles of the landless peasantry in Latin America, a new global revolutionary movement has been widely heralded.
For many commentators, this global revolution is different – its membership is found largely outside the West and much of its politics and its techniques were first developed in the global South. Paul Kingsnorth, in his bestselling One No, Many Yeses, feted as a ‘journey to the heart of the global resistance movement’, asks: ‘Has a movement this big ever existed before? Has such a diversity of forces, uncontrolled, decentralised, egalitarian, ever existed on a global scale? Has a movement led by the poor, the disenfranchised, the South, ever existed at all?’ (1)
The key distinction, setting this global revolution apart from the politics of the past is that at its core lies the demand for autonomy, not power (2). Advocates of this global-movement approach suggest that the radical movements, attempting to institute ‘globalisation from below’, bring politics and morality together by expanding the sphere of moral concern and by developing political strategies that avoid and bypass the constraints of state-based politics.
Richard Falk argues that, ‘If there is to be a more benign world order enacting a transformed politics of non-violence and social justice, it will be brought about by struggles mounted from below based on the activities of popular movements and various coalitions’ (3). Whereas state-based political action is held to reinforce frameworks and hierarchies of exclusion, new social movements ‘from below’ are seen to herald new forms of emancipatory political action, which seek to recognise and include diversity and build new forms of global ‘counter-hegemonic’ politics.
In this perspective, states are no longer perceived to be the focus for political organisation and political demands. Radical political theorists argue that nation states are a barrier to emancipatory political practice. Rather than capturing state power, the goal of the ‘global revolution’ is to constitute alternatives to the enclosed space of territorial politics. Advocates of radical global activism assert that the state-level focus of old movements limited their progressive potential: ‘It was through the state that “old” movements were “tamed”. This was true both of workers’ movements, which became left political parties and trade unions, and anti-colonial struggles, which were transformed into new ruling parties.’ (4)
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, for example, write that sovereignty is a ‘poisoned gift’, where ostensible revolutionaries ‘get bogged down in “realism”’, resulting in ‘the opposite of the nationalist dream of an autonomous, self-centred development’ as new structures of domestic and international domination become established.
According to Hardt and Negri, the agency of the new global revolution is to be found in disparate forms of resistance ‘from below’ from the 1992 Los Angeles riots, to the Palestinian Intifada and the uprising in Chiapas. The fact that these are essentially local struggles, isolated from any broader political movement, is acknowledged in Hardt and Negri’s concept of ‘incommunicability’: ‘This paradox of incommunicability makes it extremely difficult to grasp and express the new power posed by the struggles that have emerged.’ However, a focus on their purely local and immediate character would be a mistake. They are also seen to have a universal character, in that they challenge facets of global capitalist domination.
For Hardt and Negri, the Los Angeles rioters are held to challenge racial and hierarchical forms of ‘post-Fordist’ social control, the Chiapas rebels to challenge the regional construction of world markets, and so on. The key point is that, ‘Perhaps precisely because all these struggles are incommunicable and thus blocked from travelling horizontally in the form of a cycle, they are forced instead to leap vertically and touch immediately on the global level’ (5). Today, every struggle and protest is held to be part of the global struggle, with Western commentators making the connections and links, not to some shared political programme but by pointing out their contribution to the common struggle against Power itself.
There is an apparent happy coincidence that just as it seems that domestic politics is entering a terminal decline, with falling voting figures and widespread disillusionment with the political process, the global sphere should become suddenly seen as filled with the dynamic promise of radical change. Today it appears that everyone is engaged in global politics. Every campaign group, political party, non-governmental organisation (NGO), government and local authority is busy making global links and ‘making a difference’ at a global level. Why is it that the global sphere holds such an attraction for individuals and groups involved in politics?
For some cynics, it is merely the foreign junkets and chance to travel on per diem expenses that draws the attraction of our globalised political classes. For others, it is the new openness of the post-Cold War world, with fewer barriers to travel and fewer visa restrictions (for some at least). For others, it is the cheapness of air travel and mass communications that have encouraged global consciousness and new broader political horizons.
Proponents argue that the new focus on global activism captures three aspects of global progress in recent decades: firstly, the extension of political community, as the political sphere is no longer seen as limited to narrow national politics; secondly, that global activism places a normative emphasis on human agency, rather than the economic determinism of the market and the conservatism of the ‘end of history’; and finally, the role of global movements in the extension of democracy, the recasting of decision-making processes beyond exclusive national boundaries.
This essay assesses each of these claims, and suggests the addition of the decline of the attachment to domestic political engagement, in order to explain the popularity of global radicalism as an approach to both understanding and participating in political life.
- The extension of political community
Global political activism is seen as restoring collective values and morality as a counterpoint to the narrow individualism or political apathy reflected in the institutions of formal, state-based, politics.
According to Richard Falk, author and Professor of International Law and Practice and Princeton University: ‘Globalisation from below extends the sense of community, loosening the ties between sovereignty and community but building a stronger feeling of identity with the sufferings and aspirations of peoples, a wider “we”.’ (6) For Mary Kaldor, Professor in Global Governance at the London School of Economics, global activism has emerged with the end of the Cold War and growing global interconnectedness, which has undermined the importance of territorial boundaries and spatial barriers, blurring the distinctions between regions and states. These interconnected processes ‘have opened up new possibilities for political emancipation’:
‘Whether we are talking about isolated dissidents in repressive regimes, landless labourers in Central America or Asia, global campaigns against landmines or third world debt…what has changed are the opportunities for linking up with other like-minded groups in different parts of the world, and for addressing demands not just to the state but to global institutions and other states… In other words, a new form of politics, which we call civil society, is both an outcome and an agent of global interconnectedness.’ (7)
For theorists, such as Andrew Linklater, the nation state restricts the bounds of moral reasoning to the ‘boundaries of political association’. In a globalised social environment the self-determination of the individual – man’s capacity to ‘participate in the control of his total political environment’ – is restricted by the territorial limitations of sovereignty. The solution is that of radical political struggle to resolve the tensions between the moral duties of men and the political duties of citizens through the ‘actualisation of a higher form of international political life [which] requires [a] radical critique of the state’ and the formation of a broader, more inclusive community. Ronnie Lipschutz likewise argues that ‘the growth of global civil society represents an ongoing project…to reconstruct, re-imagine, or re-map world politics’ (8).
However, there is no necessary link between a critique of existing political communities and any move beyond them to the constitution of new collectivities on the global level. Linklater’s concern with the morality of exclusion would, in fact, question the morality of any social institution, from the private sphere of marriage and friendship networks to the public sphere of collective association and government. He argues that ‘although the universal communication community may never be realised completely, it is an important ethical ideal which permits the critique of defective social arrangements’ (9).
However, it is the standpoint of the abstract, isolated individual that is privileged in the radical critique of these ‘defective social arrangements’. This is captured well by Mary Kaldor, in her description of global civil society as ‘a move away from state-centred approaches’ and towards ‘more concern with individual empowerment and personal autonomy’ (10).
Richard Falk also captures well this process through which global solidarities go along with an increasingly atomised and fragmented domestic political realm. He writes: ‘…transnational solidarities, whether between women, lawyers, environmentalists, human rights activists, or other varieties of ‘citizen pilgrim’ associated with globalisation from below… [who have] already transferred their loyalties to the invisible political community of their hopes and dreams, one which could exist in future time but is nowhere currently embodied in the life-world of the planet.’ (11)
The interconnectedness that is celebrated is, in fact, the flipside of a lack of connection domestically: ‘Air travel and the internet create new horizontal communities of people, who perhaps have more in common, than with those who live close by.’ (12) What these ‘citizen pilgrims’ have in common is their isolation from and rejection of their own political communities. The transfer of loyalties to an ‘invisible political community’ is merely a radical re-representation of their rejection of a real and all too visible political community – the electorate.
Today’s global ‘revolution’ lacks a clearly defined sphere of the political. Without a prior relationship of collective aspirations and engagement, individual activism loses any sense of collective meaning. Naomi Klein describes well how, without a collective sense of purpose, derived from a shared project, there can be no political debate and no testing of ideas. She describes being invited to a post-Seattle New York conference on ‘Re-imagining politics and society’ and being ‘struck by the futility of this entire well-meaning exercise. Even if we did manage to come up with a 10-point plan – brilliant in its clarity, elegant in its coherence, unified in its outlook – to whom, exactly, would we hand down these commandments?…
‘The ideas and plans being hatched…weren’t irrelevant exactly, they just weren’t important in the way that was hoped…. They were destined to be swept up and tossed around in the tidal wave of information – Web diaries, NGO manifestos, academic papers, homemade videos, cris de Coeur – that the global anti-corporate network produces and consumes each and every day.’
There is no need to win an argument or convince an audience or reach any form of consensus. As Klein notes: ‘If somebody feels that he or she doesn’t quite fit into one of the 30,000 or so NGOs or thousands of affinity groups out there, she can just start her own and link up.’ The privileging of the individual above the social makes any form of politics impossible. Political life depends on collectivities, on a shared project of political engagement.
The belief that it is not necessary to have any allegiances beyond the autonomous individual is an appealing one for many people, disillusioned and frustrated with the formal political process. What is popular about radical politics is precisely its hostility to the old projects of the left and politics as a formal process of engagement. This lies behind the ‘deep distrust of the state’ highlighted by Naomi Klein as the central difference between radicalism today and in the past. This distrust is not a radical one, motivated by a desire to replace the state with something else; rather it encapsulates a broader distrust with traditional democratic processes and with politics itself. By placing the autonomy of the self at the centre of its ethical code, global radical approaches tend to reduce political community to the individual rather than extend it.
- Emphasising human agency
The second attraction of global theorising is that it is held to posit the need for radical human agency in distinction to the economic determinacy and perceived market dominance of globalisation theory.
As Naomi Klein reported from the first annual World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil: ‘Many people said they felt history being made in that room. What I felt was something more intangible: the end of the End of History.’ (13) By challenging the ‘end of history’ thesis, which suggests the end of radical alternatives to capitalist liberal democracy, global activists reaffirm the potential for change.
Globalisation is considered to be the central problem of international relations today. The neo-liberal perspective of the end of politics and domination of the free market, with states powerless to shape economic and social policy, is often posed as the backdrop which makes necessary the agency of global movements and a restoration of the political on a new basis. As Mary Kaldor argues: ‘Civil society is a process of management of society that is “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” and that involves the struggle for emancipatory goals. It is about governance based on consent where consent is generated through politics. In a global context, civil society offers a way of understanding the process of globalisation in terms of subjective human agency instead of a disembodied deterministic process of “interconnectedness”.’ (14)
However, the emancipatory promise of the global civil society project is an abstract, hollow and idealised view of progress. There can be no agency as long as there is no connection or mediation between the individual and the social. Where there is agency in the accounts of global-movement advocates, it is to be found in external authorities, which endow global civic actors or global citizens with recognition and act to enforce and empower them.
Despite the talk of agency, it is not the disempowered or excluded who have agency but their network advocates and the ‘enlightened’ Western states themselves. As Michael Edwards notes: ‘There is always a temptation to “leap-frog” the national arena and go direct to Washington or Brussels, where it is often easier to gain access to senior officials and thus achieve a response. This is understandable but in the long term it is a serious mistake. It increases the influence of multilateral institutions over national development and erodes the process of domestic coalition building….’ (15)
Radical global movement theorists reject the collective agency of mass political movements, preferring to highlight the self-constituting nature of ‘global space’ and ‘new’ movements that derive power from the fact of their existence rather than their transformative capacities. There is no need for agency if ‘power’ is a self-constituting product of moral and cultural values, which is never socially tested. Rather than challenging this quietism and posing a political alternative, the radical critique of the global theorists, in fact, reflects and reproduces this sense of incapacity.
The moralism at the heart of the radical challenge to the political is also its greatest problem when it comes to placing agency at the centre of political theorising: ‘The feature of liberal, cosmopolitan, social theory which generates this difficulty is, arguably, its reduction of political theory to moral theory – the insistence that a legitimate account of the political is a moralised account of the political. Thus, politics becomes equated to a search for legitimacy in which all social arrangements are regarded as in need of…justification.’ (16)
The discourse provides a moral critique of power but can never constitute a political challenge to it. The radical critique of the political is an excuse for refusal rather than grounds for collective agency. English School international relations theorist, Martin Wight, foresaw just such a consequence in the moralist critique of the political sphere:
‘It is the total withdrawal into the sphere of the private ethic, and repudiation of the political sphere altogether. It involves a passive attitude towards life…and abandonment of the will…and is very attractive to the intelligent and sensitive person today; the political sphere obviously offers nothing but insoluble predicaments; …for political incompetence and buffoonery there is nothing to choose between the political parties so there is no point in exercising one’s vote; all one can do is to retire within the sphere of private life and personal relationships.…’ (17)
The other side of the agency coin is the lack of impact of private moral protest, driven by personal conscience rather than collective political ends. For example, the anti-Iraq war movement in Britain was hailed as a success for global civic activism, and has certainly reflected widespread cynicism and luck of trust in the British government. For example, opinion polls in August 2003 showed that only six per cent of voters trusted the government more than the BBC over the weapons of mass destruction claims (18). Yet the lack of political alternatives meant that, while cynicism and lack of trust in the government were at record levels, the government’s lead over the opposition had more than doubled since the previous month.
Without an alternative collective focus, the activism of individuals is more likely to be inwardly orientated towards self-awareness and ‘personal growth’ rather than projected socially in engagement with others. The end of agency in the cultivation of individual identity as an end in-itself is well captured by the individualised activity of leading global civil society activists who are on a self-centred journey of discovery, personally travelling around the world to ‘make the links’ between the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the WTO in Seattle and Cancun, and US privatisation in Iraq (19).
- The extension of democracy
The global movement of movements is held to be a potential challenge to the non-democratic structures of global governance emerging in the wake of globalisation and the end of the Cold War: As Mary Kaldor writes: ‘What was new about the concept, in comparison with earlier concepts of civil society, was both the demand for a radical extension of both political and personal rights – the demand for autonomy, self-organization or control over life – and the global content of the concept. To achieve these demands, the new civil society actors found it necessary and possible to make alliances across borders and to address not just the state but international institutions.’
For Kaldor, global activism expands the sphere of ‘active citizenship’ referring to ‘growing self-organisation outside formal political circles and expanded space in which individual citizens can influence the conditions in which they live both directly through self-organization and through political pressure’. Similarly, James Rosenau asserts that ‘citizens now have many more avenues along which to pursue their interests’ and ‘a multitude of new points of access to the course of events’ (20).
Richard Falk argues that global civic resistance from below similarly goes beyond the limitations of state-based politics: ‘…global civil society [movements]…carry the possibility of an extension of the movement for democratisation beyond state/society relations to all arenas of power and authority… It is not a matter of insisting upon a confrontation with the geopolitical leadership, but of expressing an overriding commitment to join the struggle to shape emergent geogovernance structures in more satisfying directions and orientating normative order at all levels of social interaction….’ (21)
Rather than states being the location of democratic politics and contestation of ‘the good society’, the international sphere is the location of ‘democratisation from below through the articulation of radical and new forms of transnational citizenship and social mobilisation’ (22). For the advocates of global political activism transnational campaigning is part of the new form of global governance that is an improvement on the past.
Having established that the most important social struggles need to take place on the international level, global-movement advocates argue for the reform of governing institutions. Guardian columnist George Monbiot argues: ‘Everything has been globalised except our consent. Democracy alone has been confined to the nation state.’ For Mary Kaldor: ‘It is not possible to breathe new life into traditional representative democracy through unilateralism, or a reversal of globalisation, nor is it feasible to reconstitute this type of democracy at global levels.’ (23)
This critique of liberal democracy, at the heart of global theorising, is given a radical edge by claims that rather than being elitist, global movement advocates wish to see new and better forms of global democracy and global citizenship. However, the promise of empowerment of global activism is an illusory one. While there is support for abstract political autonomy out in ‘global space’ there is nothing but hostility to collective political projects down on ‘territorial’ planet Earth.
In fact, the popularisation of concepts such as ‘global citizenship’ stems from the normative desire to restrict, rather than extend, civil and political rights. The meaning of citizenship has been transformed and hollowed out. As John Gaventa argues: ‘An understanding of citizenship as participation puts less emphasis on rights as entitlements, to be bestowed by a nation-state or another form of government, and more emphasis on citizenship as something that is realized through responsible action.’ (24)
Every moral claim for global movement activism posits the importance of regulation above the rights claims of the subject. The claims of extending democracy are not about protecting rights claims of autonomy but promoting duties and new forms of less accountable regulation. Naomi Klein notes: ‘This is what sets the young protesters in Seattle apart from their sixties predecessors. In the age of Woodstock, refusing to play by state and school rules was regarded as a political act in itself. Now, opponents of the WTO – even many who call themselves anarchists – are outraged about the lack of rules being applied to corporations, as well as the flagrant double standards in the application of existing rules….’ (25)
The concern here is not about autonomy but regulation. This reflects the problem at the heart of much of global civil society theorising, the desire to regulate to overcome the problems of autonomous political, economic and social activity. In this context democracy is always seen as a problem rather than a solution. Richard Falk argues:
‘…to the extent that democratisation infringes upon basic normative objectives by way of militarism and consumerism, there is present a need for supervening constraints on political behaviour of governments by way of international law… Such expanded applications of international law need to be supplemented by cultural pedagogy and socialization practices that are orientated around the spread of an ethos of non-violence, ecological sustainability, and human rights, that is, in effect an offset to consumerism and militarism, a reorienting of citizenship toward the priorities of global civil society.’ (26)
Rather than the global ‘movement’ representing the ‘voices’ of the excluded and marginal through expanding democracy, Falk, one of the leading theorists in the field, argues that elected governments should be coerced into following the values of global civil society through the edicts of transnational lawyers while the citizens need to be reformed from the errors of their ways by ‘cultural pedagogy and socialization practices’.
The global-activist perspective tends to be an elitist and regulatory one that seeks to avoid establishing political legitimacy through democratic and representative means. Bearing this in mind, the widespread claim that one of the main reasons why global activism is allegedly a growing force and politically necessary – because it is the only alternative to unaccountable and undemocratic mechanisms of global governance – appears to be an unsubstantiated one.
It would appear that the attraction of global activism lies less in its ability to grasp or create change in the international realm than in its role in shaping responses to problems of the domestic sphere. Today, the domestic and international spheres appear indistinct not because the international has been transformed by radical activism but because domestic political progress no longer appears possible. Radical global theorising is predicated on the rejection of domestic political engagement by disillusioned radical and liberal commentators, and their search for new ‘spaces’ of politics and new ‘communities’ where they can project their radical demands without the constraints of having to engage with their own societies.
Radical commentators assert that ‘until citizens can seize control of global politics, we cannot regain control of national politics’ (27). This desire to solve the problems of politics at the global level, before addressing questions at the national or local level, and the perception that problems are easier to negotiate globally, where we can ‘make a difference’ (rather than nationally where we allegedly cannot), are unique aspects of our deeply estranged political times. This estrangement from our own political circumstances is crucial to any explanation of current global theorising.
The aspiration to look to the global for easy solutions to the political problems of social disengagement, and the perceived lack of any collective political meaning, is not just a radical fashion. Governments across the West similarly view domestic problems of legitimacy, trust and collective engagement as potentially resolvable through global or international activism rather than domestic initiatives. Today, it appears that the ‘global sphere’ has the answers to the existential political vacuum left by the lack of certainty, mission, political ideologies and ‘big ideas’, which has been particularly deeply felt by governments and individuals since the start of the 1990s.
This essay has suggested that the attraction of the global sphere has little to do with changes at the international level. The focus on the dynamic political promise of the global sphere is not the reflection of the growth of radical political struggles or of new social movements on the other side of the world. The ‘idealist turn’ in international relations, and global theorising in particular, stems largely from the difficulty of finding shared meaning though the domestic political process.
It would appear that the more our connections with other members of society break-down, the more we find ‘imagined communities’ in global space. The idealised normative community and ‘thick interconnections’ of global civil society invoke the Christian imagery of an ideal harmony as a counterpart to our fragmented, estranged and profane earthly existence. It is precisely the fictional, fantasy aspect of ‘global space’ that allows individuals, organisations and institutions, from NGOs to leading Western governments, to project their idealised visions of themselves onto the global plane.
Instead of seeking to avoid political responsibility and accountability, the task of those who wish to engage in the project of emancipatory politics is surely to start to restore relations of trust and collective responsibility, rather than seek to escape or to undermine them. If we cannot politically, socially and intellectually engage with those closest to us we are never going to be able to construct a broader sense of shared community or revitalise the political.
David Chandler is senior lecturer in international relations at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster. He is the author of:
- Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
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- From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (Pluto Press, 2002)
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- Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton (Pluto Press, 2000)
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And he is the editor of:
- Protecting the Bosnian Peace: Lessons from a Decade of Nation Building (Routledge, 2004)
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- Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002)
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(1) The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order, George Monbiot, Harper Perennial, 2004, p10; ‘The New Anarchists’, David Graeber, in A Movement of Movements: Is Another World Really Possible?, ed Tom Mertes, Verso, 2004, p207; One No, Many Yeses, Paul Kingsnorth, Free Press, 2004, p329
(2) ‘Autonomy: Creating Spaces for Freedom’, in We are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism, ed Notes from Nowhere, Verso, 2003, p107-119
(3) On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Richard A Falk, Polity, 1995, p18
(4) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Mary Kaldor, Polity, 2003, p86
(5) Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Harvard University Press, 2001, p133, 54, 56
(6) On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Richard A Falk, Polity, 1995, p89
(7) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Mary Kaldor, Polity, 2003, p2
(8) ‘Men and Citizens in International Relations’, Andrew Linklater, Review of International Studies, 1981, Vol.7, No.1, p27, 35; ‘Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society’, Ronnie D Lipschutz, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1992, Vol.21, No.3, p391
(9) The Transformation of Political Community, Andrew Linklater, Cambridge: Polity, 1998, p123
(10) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Mary Kaldor, Polity, 2003, p6
(11) On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Richard A Falk, Polity, 1995, p212
(12) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Mary Kaldor, Polity, 2003, p111-112
(13) Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalisation Debate, Naomi Klein, Flamingo, 2002, p15, 20, 229, 193
(14) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Mary Kaldor, Polity, 2003, p142
(15) Michael Edwards, ‘Introduction’ to Global Citizen Action, ed Michael Edwards and John Gaventa, Earthscan, 2001, p8-9
(16) Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today, Chris Brown, Cambridge: Polity, 2002, p184
(17) International Theory: The Three Traditions, Martin Wight, Continuum, 1991, p256-7
(18) Poll shows Blair losing voters’ trust, Sarah Hall, Guardian, 19 August 2003
(19) Activists must follow the money, Naomi Klein, Guardian, 12 September 2003
(20) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Mary Kaldor, Polity, 2003, p76, 8; ‘Citizenship in a Changing Global Order’, James N Rosenau, in Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, ed James N Rosenau Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p285
(21) On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Richard A Falk, Polity, 1995, p35
(22) ‘Democratisation Studies Globalisation: the Coming of Age of a Paradigm’, Jean Grugel, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2003, Vol.5, No.2, p263
(23) The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for a New World Order, George Monbiot, Harper Perennial, 2004, p1; Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Mary Kaldor, Polity, 2003, p148
(24) J. Gaventa, ‘Global Citizen Action: Lessons and Challenges’, in Edwards and Gaventa, eds Global Citizen Action, p278
(25) Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalisation Debate, Naomi Klein, Flamingo, 2002, p5
(26) On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Richard A Falk, Polity, 1995, p118
(27) Rattling the bars, George Monbiot, Guardian, 18 November 2003
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