Was democracy really ‘saved’ in Moldova?

From Brussels to Chisinau, sighs of relief gave way to open rejoicing as it became clear that Moldova’s pro-EU governing party had not only won Sunday’s parliamentary election but also retained an overall majority. Provisional results gave the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) around 50 per cent of the vote, leaving the two main opposition groupings, the Patriotic Electoral Bloc and the Alternativa Bloc, trailing with 24 per cent and eight per cent respectively.

The election had been cast by the passionately pro-EU president, Maia Sandu, as a choice between an EU future and a return to Moscow’s orbit, with the main opposition parties branded ‘pro-Russian’. Igor Grosu, leader of Sandu’s PAS, said it had been ‘an extraordinarily difficult battle’ and that Russia had thrown ‘everything it had’ at the election. Claims of ‘massive’ Russian interference were a staple of the PAS campaign.

The result was also hailed by European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, who wrote on X: ‘You made your choice clear: Europe. Democracy. Freedom.’ The Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk, also congratulated Sandu on having ‘saved democracy’ and ‘stopped Russia in its attempts to take control over the whole region’. ‘A good lesson’, he said, ‘for us all’.

The clarity of the vote seems to reinforce the choice (narrowly) made by Moldovan voters in last year’s referendum on EU membership and opens the way for Moldova to advance its European ambitions. It also removes the need for PAS to join another party in a coalition that could have risked instability or forced another election before long.

So far, so obviously positive for Moldova’s pro-West, pro-EU orientation – so positive, in fact, that after the mainstream Western media had spent days warning about the dire threat of Russian interference (rarely qualified as ‘alleged’) in this small south-east European country, Moldova had almost vanished from most news bulletins by the morning after the election.

It is at this point, however, that the election in this EU-aspiring state deserves far more scrutiny than it received during the campaign – or is likely to receive now, in the wake of the desired victory.

One question that’s never asked is how ‘massive’ was Russia’s interference, anyway? Sundry ‘police reports’ were cited in the run-up to the election, without chapter or verse. Actual evidence – either of disinformation campaigns or money changing hands – was hard to come by, although the BBC reported people being offered money (did they receive any?) to make pro-Russia social-media posts. You don’t have to believe Russian denials to conclude from the scale of the PAS victory alone that the pro-EU party could have won on its own merits, even if it might not have secured an overall majority, without scaremongering about Russian meddling.

Besides, this insistence on branding the main opposition parties ‘pro-Russia’ – when they might more accurately be described as nationalist, populist or seeking a modus vivendi with Russia – dulls legitimate complaints about the status quo. Moldova is hardly flourishing economically or democratically. The cost of living has left many behind. Corruption persists in ruling circles and dirty money is not unknown. Many of the brightest and best are leaving the country (on Romanian passports) for the EU. Fears also persist that the war in neighbouring Ukraine could spill over into Moldova. Most such fears – the kind of thing that ought to be debated during an election – were drowned out by the constant drumbeat about Russian interference.

What’s more, some of the ways the Moldovan government used its power during the campaign should raise eyebrows at the very least. Dozens of men were arrested, accused of travelling to Serbia for training designed to incite unrest in Moldova. It remains to be seen what evidence there is and how many will actually be prosecuted. Similarly, two smaller opposition groups were banned just two days before the election for supposed illicit financing. On polling day itself, Moldova accused Russia of instigating bomb threats at foreign polling stations.

There were also reports that voters with Moldovan papers from the eastern enclave of Transnistria – perhaps less likely to be pro-EU – had difficulty accessing polling stations. Will any of this be investigated? Unlikely, given that the government had secured its desired outcome.

Moldova (population around three million) is a small and complicated country, sandwiched between Romania to the west and Ukraine to the east, with no direct access to the sea. As with Georgia and Ukraine, its geography means that its interests may not always coincide with those of Western Europe. At the very least, there should be room for more variegated views than the polarising, all-or-nothing ‘EU vs Moscow’ choice that dominates its politics.

Next weekend there is another election – this time in Czechia – which may bring back the billionaire former prime minister Andrej Babis, cast by some as a pro-Russia populist aided by Russian disinformation. Babis’s current double-digit lead and Czechia’s firmer democratic foundations, compared with Moldova’s, mean the incumbent, Petr Fiala, could well be beaten. However, speculation has already surfaced that the ‘wrong’ result might lead the Czech president to annul the vote or override it to reappoint Fiala. Support for the Ukraine war is a central campaign issue, with Fiala long one of Ukraine’s most fervent supporters.

In the meantime, the Moldova result suggests that EU enlargement will continue, with Brussels at risk of importing another country whose democratic credentials leave much to be desired. Yet it seems these problems will be overlooked, as long as the ‘right’ people win.

Mary Dejevsky is a writer and broadcaster. She was Moscow correspondent for The Times between 1988 and 1992. She has also been a correspondent from Paris, Washington and China.