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spiked's E = mc2 centenary survey was conceived by, and conducted in collaboration with, science communicator Alom Shaha as part of Einstein Year, and was sponsored by NESTA (the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts). Over 250 renowned scientists, science communicators and educators - including 11 Nobel laureates - were asked what they would teach the world about science and why, if they could pick just one thing.
A number of key questions emerge from the survey responses and the differences between them, and seven of these questions are outlined below. They do not necessarily have a definitive answer, but they represent interesting tensions in the way that science is understood and presented, and they are a useful starting point for debating how best to convey the content and worth of scientific endeavour to the general public.
- Is science an exceptional
way of approaching the world?
A number of respondents assert that science
is an exceptional way of approaching the world,
distinct from and in many respects superior
to alternative cultural and religious approaches.
Lewis Wolpert
argues that 'science is the best way to understand
the world', and Timandra
Harkness similarly argues that 'science
is our best tool for building a workable model
of the objective, natural world'. According
to Fiona
Fox, it is 'harder to bullshit in science
than in any other area of public life', and
according to Julien
Clinton Sprott, 'science offers a method
for distinguishing truth from superstition,
myth and prejudice'. Henry
Joy McCracken explains that 'science is
not dogma, but proceeds by trial and error'.
Five respondents - D
Keith Bowen, Tracey
Brown, Philip
Johnson-Laird, Martin
Perl and James
Trefil - make the case for the exceptional
merits of science by emphasising its grounding
in empiricism. Five respondents - Sonja
Boehmer-Christiansen, Geoffrey
Greenwood, Harold
Kroto, Seth
Lloyd and Alan
McHughen - discuss the universality of science,
the fact that it aspires to discover objective
truth. Alan
McHughen says that 'science is the modern
world's lingua franca', while Harold
Kroto argues that 'if there is no universal
bedrock of global truth upon which to base an
answer, then the question is not conceptually
valid'.
Peter Cochrane,
John Krebs
and Lee
Silver make a firm distinction between science
and faith, Lee
Silver arguing forcefully that 'the discipline
of science is as far removed from faith as anything
can possibly be'. But in other responses to
the survey, this distinction is not as clear-cut.
According to Mark
Lythgoe, 'from the moment you are born,
and sometimes before, you place blind faith
in the scientific method', while Piet
Hut claims that 'science, like most human
activities, is based upon a belief - namely,
the assumption that nature is understandable'.
Five respondents - Stuart
Blackman, Michel
Cabanac, JMD
Coey, Stevan
Harnad and Paul
Lauterbur - argue that science is essentially
the same thing as common sense. This assumes
that science is not exceptional, inasmuch as
it coincides with the approach to understanding
that prevails in society. Whether this is in
fact the case today is an interesting point
to consider, as is Michael
Fitzpatrick's caveat that 'the evidence
of our emotions - indeed, the evidence of our
senses - is often misleading'. A related point,
raised by Vivienne
Parry's argument that 'you do not have to
be bright to do science', is whether or not
scientific understanding is difficult to achieve.
Even if we accept that science is exceptional,
this is not to say that its application is appropriate
in every province of human endeavour. Philip
Ball argues that 'any attempt to concoct
a scientific explanation of what life is will,
inevitably, be somewhat arbitrary and incomplete',
while Toby
Andrew urges us to 'beware the natural scientist
who makes generalisations outside their area
of expertise'.
- Is there a scientific method,
and if so, what does it consist in?
After the theory of evolution, the scientific
method is the most popular survey response.
20 respondents - Jim
Al-Khalili, Timothy
Ball, Simon
Best, Bill
Cooke, David
Dobson, James
Enstrom, Andrew
Fabian, Alastair
Kent, Stephen
Kosslyn, Stephen
Ladyman, Chris
Lamb, Norman
Lewis, Martin
Livermore, Mark
Lythgoe, Robert
Naeye, Claude
Roy, Michael
Shermer, Simon
Singh, Julien
Clinton Sprott and John
Stachel - say that they would teach the
world about the scientific method itself, rather
than about a specific scientific concept, principle
or discovery.
Despite the popularity of the scientific method
as a survey response, few respondents offer
an explicit definition of what this method is
- which is perhaps understandable, since it
is difficult to imagine conveying a method except
by example. Harold
Kroto argues that 'the scientific method...should
actually be called something much more general
- like "The Method of Reaching Fundamental Understanding
of the Physical World, the Natural World and
the Mind of Man"'.
Nonetheless, a number of respondents do identify
what they see as key elements of the scientific
method - for example, the formulation and experimental
testing of falsifiable hypotheses, the independent
verification of experimental results to ensure
that these results are point-of-view invariant,
and the need for theories to predict phenomena
accurately before these theories can achieve
the standing of laws. Francis Bacon, Galileo
Galilei and Karl Popper are variously credited
by respondents with developing the scientific
method as we know it.
But the notion that there is a definitive scientific
method is contentious. Christopher
Essex, for example, talks disparagingly
of those who 'try to embrace scientific thinking
as a recipe' and who 'talk of the scientific
method, as if there is just one'. Bill
Durodié argues that 'understanding
the supposed scientific method, without appreciating
the driving role of social context, is both
limited and limiting'. And Susan
Haack urges us to 'stop worrying...about
the ever-elusive scientific method'.
The contentiousness of the scientific method
is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that
it is invoked by respondents to support contrary
positions. Stephen
Ladyman illustrates the scientific method
by arguing that 'it might not be possible to
absolutely prove that greenhouse gas emissions
cause global warming, but the evidence suggests
that they do, and so wise governments act accordingly'.
And yet according to Timothy
Ball, contemporary thinking about global
warming reflects the fact that 'the scientific
method is effectively being blocked'.
- Is the natural world ordered?
While science necessarily assumes that the natural
world is intelligible, there is an interesting
distinction between those survey responses that
suggest that order is intrinsic to the natural
world, and those survey responses that suggest
that order derives from human engagement with
the natural world.
Suggesting that order is intrinsic to the natural
world, John
Harnad observes that 'nature seems to be
governed by laws - it is not random or incomprehensible'.
Paul Davies
argues that 'there is an actually existing world
out there, which is ordered in an intelligible
way'. Frank
Wilczek says that 'precise mathematical
laws govern the behaviour of matter'. And Marcus
du Sautoy claims that when the Greeks proved
that that there are infinitely many prime numbers,
'humankind realised that, by pure thought alone,
it could prove eternal truths of the universe'.
Robin Carrell
looks at a different aspect of the natural world
in his discussion of entropy, observing that
'nature tends spontaneously to revert to disorder'.
And Victor
Stenger argues that 'the laws of physics
were not handed down from above, nor are they
built into the logical structure of the universe
- they are human inventions'. The possibility
of reconciling these differing views, as to
whether and how the natural world is ordered,
can be found in the responses of John
Gillott, who considers 'the coexistence
of a directionless, non-purposive natural world
with humans and human societies'; and Peter
Martin, who argues that 'nature is simultaneously
arbitrary and ordered'.
- How do we distinguish scientific
scepticism from cynicism and from relativism?
A number of survey responses emphasise the tentative,
provisional character of scientific knowledge,
stressing the importance of doubt and uncertainty.
Few respondents go as far as Pallab
Ghosh does, with his bald statement that
'nothing is true', or even as far as Monica
Grady's assertion that 'science is not right
or wrong, is not good or bad, and does not have
final answers'.
But a number of respondents do say something
along the lines of Kathy
Sykes' argument that in science, 'what we
have is wrapped in uncertainties, caveats and
simplifications'. Others who make similar points
include Frances
Ashcroft, Mark
Brake, Freeman
Dyson, Edmond
Fischer, Christopher
Frith, Paul
Harrison, Howard
Hayden, Bruce
Joyce, Harold
Kroto, Leon
Lederman, Ian
Mills, Robert
Moor, Gary
Sharp, Peter
Tallack and Dick
Taverne.
This raises the question of how to distinguish
healthy scientific scepticism (the antidote
to dogmatism) from cynicism (the jaded mistrust
of all authority) and from relativism (the notion
that there is no objective, universal truth
worth speaking of). John
McCarthy suggests that there is a
distinction between these things, when he says
he would teach the world 'scepticism, but not
cynicism'. And William
Graeme Laver's exhortation 'do not believe
everything you are told' is notably different
than if he had said 'do not believe anything
you are told'.
Responses that help to distinguish scepticism
from cynicism or relativism include those of
John Stachel,
who explains that 'science has developed methods
for providing us with knowledge, that are both
fallible and corrigible'; and Barry
Schwartz, who argues that 'science, done
well, combines a reverence for truth with an
appreciation of doubt and uncertainty'. Stephen
Senn also offers some useful clarification,
explaining that 'the scientific attitude is
that it is reasonable to act as if a theory
were true, while accepting that it may be false
- if it is the best tested theory available
so far not found wanting'.
- How can a layperson tell
whether a scientific claim is true?
At a time when scientific controversies are
often argued by appeal to scientific authority,
it is striking how many survey responses argue
that laypersons are capable of assessing competing
scientific claims. These responses range from
Ben Goldacre's
statement that 'science is not about sweeping
statements from authority figures in white coats'
and Peter
Marsh's claim that 'science is not just
something that boffins do', to Vivian
Moses advising us 'not easily to accept
any information, unless you know exactly where
it came from, and could check it for yourself'.
Some respondents go even further. David
Lane says that 'science can be verified
by anyone, of any race or religion', Seth
Lloyd says that 'scientific knowledge consists
exactly of those results that can be verified
by anyone who puts in the effort to check them',
and Gerald
Jay Sussman quotes Galileo's saying that
'in questions of science, the authority of a
thousand is not worth the humble reasoning of
a single individual'.
Christopher
Essex goes the furthest on this question,
arguing that 'there is no authority in scientific
thinking, because it is thinking with your own
head instead of thinking with someone else's'.
But while the sentiment that scientific reasoning
is - at least potentially - available to all
seems to be positive and laudable, it is also
worth asking where this leaves scientific credentials
and expertise.
- Will the project of scientific
advance ever be concluded?
John Horgan
argues provocatively in his survey response
that 'the quest for knowledge is finite, and
may be drawing to a close'. Thomas
Deichmann says the precise opposite, arguing
that 'science is based upon premises that ensure
its permanent and infinite progress'. This raises
the question of whether scientific advance is
a project that has a conclusion.
John Horgan
explains his position by arguing that 'we are
unlikely to discover something truly astonishing
- like the lost continent of Atlantis, or dinosaurs
dwelling inside the Earth'. But Leo
Chalupa decries this reasoning, describing
his exasperation when a former student of his
'thought that there was a limited cadre of facts
that needed to be discovered, and that once
this was done, there was no point in carrying
on'. Elsewhere, Bob
Bloomfield claims that 'science as the search
for answers actually generates only more questions',
and Matt
Ridley says that 'science increases the
store of wonder and mystery in the world; it
does not erode it'.
- What is humanity's appropriate
role in relation to nature?
Despite respondents such as Timandra
Harkness, Bernard
Lovell and John
Midwinter emphasising the political neutrality
of science, one of the most marked distinctions
between survey responses is arguably a matter
of politics rather than of science - namely,
humanity's appropriate role in relation to nature.
On the one hand, several respondents argue that
the appropriate stance for humanity is one of
humility. Susan
Blackmore argues that 'evolution by natural
selection is the antidote to human arrogance',
Rafael
Sorkin says the Copernican principle 'should
teach our species a certain humility that it
sorely needs with respect to the ecosphere',
and Anthony Bradshaw urges us 'to appreciate
our origins and our place in the world, and
to be humble'. Martin
Rees looks beyond humanity's tenure on Earth:
'It will not be humans who watch the Sun's demise,
six billion years from now. Any creatures that
exist then will be as different from us, as
we are from bacteria or amoebae.'
On the other hand, several respondents see science
as an endeavour that goes hand in hand with
humanism. According to Stuart
Derbyshire, 'science is uniquely important
because it increases the possibility for human
action'. And Ellie
Lee argues that 'through the application
of science, we can understand better and better
what it means to be human, because we can control
and manipulate more and more of nature'.
Elsewhere, Philip
Ball argues that 'a human-centred view of
life - while natural enough - is wholly at odds
with a scientific point of view', whereas John
Gillott says: 'A human-centred view is neither
hubristic, nor foolhardy. Such a view is simply
the only meaningful way of thinking about a
whole range of questions.'
- Other themes addressed in survey responses
As might be expected, many respondents draw upon Einstein's ideas to illustrate their responses. Surprisingly few respondents, however, say that that they would teach the world something specifically about Einstein. Two exceptions are David Perks, who says that he would teach the world Einstein's two postulates of special relativity; and Quentin Cooper, who cites Einstein's dictum that 'things should be made as simple as possible, but not any simpler'.
Einstein's ideas are more frequently cited by survey respondents to make broader points about science. For example, six respondents - James Enstrom, Hans Erren, Christopher Llewellyn-Smith, Robert Naeye, Stephen Senn and Lee Silver - describe the way that Isaac Newton's understanding of mechanics was superseded by that of Einstein. This example is used to illustrate the provisional nature of scientific theories, and to make the point that even established theories are open to falsification.
The most popular theme in the survey
reponses is the theory of evolution. Twenty-three
respondents - Scott
Atran, Jesse
Bering, James
Binney, Susan
Blackmore, Walter
Bodmer, Anthony
Bradshaw, Geoffrey
Burnstock, Rita
Carter, Vinton
Cerf, Brian
Charlesworth, Bruce
Charlton, Mark
Chase, Bill
Cooke, Richard
Dawkins, Keith
Devlin, Mel
Greaves, Caspar
Hewett, John
Krebs, Conrad
Lichtenstein, Peter
Raven, Jeffrey
Shallit, John
Sulston and Amotz
Zahavi - say that they would teach the world
about evolution by natural selection. Four of
these respondents emphasise the fact that evolutionary
theory is sufficient to account for the existence
and attributes of living organisms, eliminating
the need to posit a grand designer.
Related to the scientific method, a number of respondents say that they would teach the world something generic about science and the way it proceeds. Such responses include 'science can validate experience, but not deny it' (Ralph Abraham); 'the principle of scientific inference' (Amir Aczel); 'the underdetermination of theory by evidence' (Julian Baggini); 'knowledge of science is fundamental to our quality of life' (Janet Bainbridge); 'scientists fall in love - with experiments' (Simon Baron-Cohen); 'real discoveries in science are unanticipated' (Neil Bartlett); 'why science is thrilling' (Brian Clegg); 'the dose makes the poison' (Gregory Conko); 'how science inspires puzzlement and wonder' (Tana Dineen); and 'scientists start by trying very hard to disprove what they hope is true' (Antony Hoare).
A number of respondents discuss
aspects of mathematics, but only one -
Norman Levitt
- says that he would teach the world mathematics
per se. John
Ball would teach the world to distinguish
between mathematical models and their implementation
on computers; John
Casti would teach the world about the mathematician
and physicist Leonhard Euler's expression, linking
five of the key mathematical constants; Paul
Cohn would teach the world techniques to facilitate
calculation; and Joe
Kaplinsky would teach the world Galileo Galilei's
account of the role that mathematics plays in
science.
Eleven respondents - Branko
Babic, Jack
Barrett, Deeph
Chana, Stanley
Feldman, Ian
Fells, Liz
Frayn, Roald
Hoffmann, Zbigniew
Jaworowski, Peggy
Lemaux, M
Mihkel Mathiesen and S
Fred Singer - offer some aspect of energy
and thermodynamics as their answer to the
survey; while four respondents - John
Harnad, Chris
Isham, Michio
Kaku and Frank
Tipler - respond with aspects of quantum
theory. Nicola
Drury and Clifford
Pickover use their responses to champion stem-cell
research.
Five respondents - Lynne Frostick, Jack Harris, Jeffrey Harvey, Tony Juniper and Charles Kohlhase - offer aspects of ecology and the environment as their answer to the survey, principally discussing the dangers of anthropogenic climate change. And 11 respondents - Simon Best, Jennifer Cunningham, Timothy Gowers, Madhav Khandekar, David Lane, Christopher Llewellyn-Smith, Vivienne Parry, Jack Pridham, Oliver Pybus, Christian Spenger and E Bruce Waygood - say they would teach the world about risk and statistics, so that among other things, we might assess threats to our wellbeing more rationally.
Many respondents nominate particular scientific exemplars - individuals, ideas or discoveries that they claim best represent the merits of science. The American physicist Richard Feynman is cited by eight respondents, four of whom - Colin Atkinson, Sallie Baliunas, Jack Dunitz, and John Gribbin - offer Feynman's concise formulation of the atomic hypothesis, 'all things are made of atoms', as their answer to the survey. Eight people cite Nicolaus Copernicus, of whom two - J Richard Gott III and Rafael Sorkin - offer the Copernican principle, the idea that humanity's location in the universe is unlikely to be special, as their response. The nineteenth-century British biologist Thomas Henry Huxley is cited by six respondents, three of whom - Stuart Blackman, John Brignell and John Burland - offer one of Huxley's precepts as their answer. Tom Addiscott and Robert Maynard cite the philosopher Karl Popper, specifically his formulation of the hypothetico-deductive system.
Ideas and discoveries nominated as exemplars include the molecules known as amphiphiles (Alec Bangham); the periodic table (Peter Borrows); the connection between electricity and magnetism (E Brian Davies); molecular machinery (K Eric Drexler); microbes (Brian Ford); plate tectonics (Richard Fortey and Peter Sammonds); osmosis (Harold Hammel); Pythagoras' theorem (Alan Hudson); the American meteorologist Vern Dvorak's technique for monitoring tropical cyclones (Christopher Landsea); materials science (Mark Miodownik); the combustion engine (Austin Williams); chaos theory (David Wojick); and the principles of nuclear fission and fusion and their role in politics (James Woudhuysen).
Three respondents - Gerardus
't Hooft, Wolfgang
Ketterle, and Richard
Morris - say that they are unable or unwilling
to answer the survey question. Gerardus
't Hooft contends that the survey is a philistine exercise: 'spiked's question
sounds exactly like the question often asked by students - "what parts of the
text in this book should I learn, to pass my test, and which parts
may I skip?" I refuse to answer that.' Wolfgang
Ketterle explains that 'science is a network
of knowledge, and it is impossible to single out
one thing', while Richard
Morris argues: 'Principles do not have intrinsic
importance. They derive their importance from
their relevance to people's lives.'
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